The first two books on behavior analysis (Skinner, 1938; Keller & Schoenfeld, 1950) had chapter-length coverage of motivation. The next generation of texts also had chapters on the topic, but by the late 1960s it was no longer being given much treatment in the behavior-analytic literature. The present failure to deal with the topic leaves a gap in our understanding of operant functional relations. A partial solution is to reintroduce the concept of the establishing operation, defined as an environmental event, operation, or stimulus condition that affects an organism by momentarily altering (a) the reinforcing effectiveness of other events and (b) the frequency of occurrence of that part of the organism's repertoire relevant to those events as consequences. Discriminative and motivative variables can be distinguished as follows: The former are related to the differential availability ofan effective form ofreinforcement given a particular type of behavior; the latter are related to the differential reinforcing effectiveness ofenvironmental events. An important distinction can also be made between unconditioned establishing operations (UEOs), such as food deprivation and painful stimulation, and conditioned establishing operations (CEOs) that depend on the learning history of the organism. One type of CEO is a stimulus that has simply been paired with a UEO and as a result may take on some of the motivative properties ofthat UEO. The warning stimulus in avoidance procedures is another important type of CEO referred to as reflexive because it establishes its own termination as a form of reinforcement and evokes the behavior that has accomplished such termination. Another CEO is closely related to the concept of conditional conditioned reinforcement and is referred to as a transitive CEO, because it establishes some other stimulus as a form of effective reinforcement and evokes the behavior that has produced that other stimulus. The multiple control of human behavior is very common, and is often quite complex. An understanding ofunlearned and learned establishing operations can contribute to our ability to identify and control the various components of such multiple determination.
In commonsense psychology, what a person does is generally thought to be a function oftwo broad factors, knowledge and motivation. For any particular behavior to occur (except for "involuntary" acts such as reflexes), the behaver must know how and must also want to do it. A good deal of traditional psychological theory concerns the different kinds of wants and the way they interact with other mental functions; much ofapplied psychology is concerned with getting people to do things that they know how to do but don't want to do. Motivation seems to be an important topic, yet the basic notion plays only a small role in the approach currently referred to as behavior analysis.
In applied behavior analysis or behavior modification, the concept of reinforcement seems to have taken over much of the subject matter that was once con-sidered a part of the topic of motivation. To some extent this replacement is reasonable. With the discovery of the role of reinforcement in the maintenance of behavior-schedules of intermittent reinforcement-many examples of insufficient motivation could be better interpreted as examples ofinsufficient ongoing reinforcement. The replacement was also attractive because the more common motivational terms-wants, needs, drives, motives-usually referred to inner entities whose existence and essential features were inferred from the very behavior that they were supposed to explain.
Reinforcement history is not, however, a complete replacement for motivative functional relations. Skinner (1938, chap. 9 and 10, 1953, chap. 9) clearly distinguishes deprivation and satiation from other kinds of environmental variables and relates these operations to the traditional concept ofdrive, as did Keller and Schoenfeld (1950, chap. 9 ). Skinner's treatment of aversive stimulation (e.g., 1953 , chap. 11) is very similar to his treatment ofdeprivation, and Keller and Schoenfeld classify aversive stimulation as one ofthe drives (1950, chap. 9) . Later, in his treatment ofverbal behavior (1957, pp. 28-33,212-214) , Skinner again identifies deprivation and aversive stimulation as independent variables that are quite different in function from reinforcement and stimulus control. ' Subsequent behavioral texts at first continued to provide a separate chapter on deprivation (e.g., Holland & Skinner, 1961; Lundin, 1961 Lundin, , 1969 Millenson, 1967; Millenson & Leslie, 1979) , but more recent texts have almost dropped the topic (e.g., Catania, 1979 Catania, , 1984 Fantino & Logan, 1979; Mazur, 1986 Mazur, , 1990 ; Powers & Osborne, 1976) . The handbook by Honig (1966) and the later one by Honig and Staddon (1977) each contain a chapter on motivation by Teitelbaum (1966, 1977) ; these differ from the earlier treatments in being concerned largely with relations between physiological variables and behavior. The Honig and Staddon handbook also contains a chapter by Collier, Hirsch, and Kanarek (1977) , in which feeding behavior is analyzed in the context ofits ecological significance. Like that of Teitelbaum, this approach is very different from the earlier ones, and is one that is to some extent critical ofsome ofthe assumptions about motivation in Skinner's earlier treatments. Neither the physiological nor the ecological type of analysis seems to have been incorporated in the more recent "nontreatments" of the topic of motivation.
The present state of affairs, with motivative variables being dealt with as reinforcement history, deprivation and satiation, or aversive stimulation, is not entirely satisfactory, however.2 Variables ' The topic of emotion is closely related to motivation in these treatments, either as an adjacent chapter (chap. 11 in Skinner, 1938; chap. 10 in Keller & Schoenfeld, 1950; chap. 10 in Skinner, 1953) or as part of a group of closely related independent variables (as in Skinner, 1957) . 2 Kantor's settingfactor (1959, p. 14) includes motivative variables, but until recently this concept has not been much used within the behavioral comwith behavioral effects similar to those of deprivation and aversive stimulation, but that cannot be easily classified as either, are likely to be ignored or misclassified (usually as discriminative stimuli). What follows is an attempt to provide a more thorough and systematic approach than usually appears, and one that corrects this latter difficulty.
Establishing Operation Defined in Terms of Two Features
An establishing operation-the term was first used by Keller and Schoenfeld (1950) and later by Millenson (1967) is an environmental event, operation, or stimulus condition that affects an organism by momentarily altering (a) the reinforcing effectiveness ofother events and (b) the frequency3 of occurrence of that part ofthe organism's repertoire relevant to those events as consequences.
The first effect can be called reinforcer establishing and the second evocative. Thus, food deprivation is an establishing operation (EO) that momentarily increases the effectiveness offood as a form of reinforcement. But food deprivation not only establishes food as an effective form of reinforcement if the organism should encounter food; it also momentarily increases the frequency ofthe types of behavior that have been previously reinforced with food. In other words, it evokes any behavior that has been followed by food reinforcement. This evocative effect is probably best thought of as (a) the result of a direct effect of the EO on such behavior, (b) an increase in the evocative effectiveness of all SDS for behavior that has been followed by food reinforcement, and (c) an increase in the frequency of behavior that has been followed by conditioned reinforcers whose munity (but see Morris, Higgins, & Bickel, 1982 An effort has sometimes been made to interpret the evocative effect of an EO as the result of stimuli produced by the relevant deprivation (hunger pangs, dry mouth and throat) functioning as discriminative stimuli (SDs) for the relevant behavior (e.g., Staats, 1963, pp. 11 1-112 4A change in the momentary or current frequency of all behavior that has been followed by a particular type of reinforcement is to be contrasted with a change in thefuture frequency of the particular type of behavior that preceded a particular instance of reinforcement. Changes in future frequency define function-altering relations (reinforcement, punishment, extinction), whereas changes in current frequency define evocative relations (the effects of a discriminative stimulus and the various kinds of establishing operations). For a detailed treatment of this distinction, both for operant and respondent relations, see Michael (1983) Painful stimulation: Escape. The onset of painful stimulation establishes the reduction or offset ofthis stimulation as an effective form of reinforcement and evokes the behavior that has achieved such reduction or offset. That painful stimulation is a UEO rather than an SD is not well appreciated. The issue can be most easily analyzed by reference to a typical laboratory shock-escape procedure. The response that turns offthe shock (often a lever press) is clearly evoked by the shock onset, and it is also clearly a part of an operant rather than a respondent relation because it was developed through the use of shock offset as reinforcement. If the only known operant evocative relation were the SD, then shock onset would seem to be an SD; but, like the stimuli called hunger pangs, it fails to qualify as a discriminative variable because its absence has not been a condition in which an effective form of reinforcement was unavailable for a particular type of behavior.
To repeat the argument, an SD is a stimulus condition that has been correlated with the availability of a type of consequence given a type of behavior. A correlation with availability has two components: An effective consequence (one whose EO was in effect) must have followed the response in the presence of the stimulus, and the response must have occurred without the consequence (which would have been effective as reinforcement if it had been obtained) in the absence of the stimulus. The correlation between painful stimulation and consequence availability fails in the second component. In the absence ofshock, there is no effective consequence that could have failed to follow the response in an analogue to the extinction responding that occurs in the absence of an SD. In the absence of shock, the relevant establishing operation is absent. The fact that the lever press does not turn off the "nonpresent" shock is in no sense extinction responding, but rather is behaviorally neutral, like the unavailability of food reinforcement when one is satiated. Contrast this situation with extinction when an SD is absent-the food-deprived rat presses the lever but fails to receive food, which would at that moment be effective as reinforcement if it were obtained. The absence of the shock is more like the absence of food deprivation than like the absence ofthe SD. With no shock present, shock termination is not an effective form of reinforcement.
Note that in addition to its EO evocative effect, the onset of a painful stimulus also functions as a respondent UE in eliciting a number of smooth muscle and gland responses such as increased heart rate, pupillary dilation, adrenal secretion, and so forth; as a respondent UC (unconditioned conditioner) in conditioning these responses to other stimuli present at the time; as an SP (it is convenient to use the symbol SR for unconditioned reinforcement and Sr for conditioned reinforcement; similarly, SP is used for unconditioned punishment and SP for conditioned punishment) in decreasing the future frequency of any type of behavior that precedes it; possibly as an SD for any response that has been correlated with the availability ofsome form of reinforcement other than pain reduction (e.g., lever pressing for food); and possibly as a respondent CE (conditioned elicitor), ifpain has been paired with some other UC (unconditioned conditioner) such as food, in which case pain might elicit salivation (this would probably work only with mild pain because intense pain as a UE would probably elicit autonomic activity that is incompatible with salivation).
It is possible that, in general, there is a close correlation among several ofthese functions. Maybe any stimulus, the onset ofwhich can function as a UEO in evoking its own termination, will also function as a UE and a UC with respect to certain smooth muscle and gland responses (the activation syndrome, for example), and will also function as an SP in weakening any response that precedes its onset. This seems to be the implication of much current use of the term aversive stimulus, where the specific behavioral function is not identified. It is not clear at present just how close the correlation among these functions is, nor is it clear that the advantages of an omnibus term of this sort outweigh the disadvantage of its lack of specificity. It is clear that some use of this term is simply a behavioral translation of commonsense expressions for "feelings," "states of mind," and so on, an undesirable usage that is fostered by the term's lack ofspecificity. The same problem arises when "reinforcement" is used without the implication of a strengthening effect on preceding behavior, but rather as a synonym for "pleasant" or "desired," as in the too often heard "That's very reinforcing!"
To keep the term reinforcement specific to its strengthening function and still have an omnibus term for positive events, one might use appetitive as the opposite of aversive. In this usage, an appetitive stimulus or condition would be one that elicits certain smooth muscle and gland responses, conditions neutral stimuli so that they elicit similar responses, increases the future frequency of the type of behavior preceding its onset (SR), suppresses the behavior that removes it (UEO), and decreases the future frequency of the behavior that precedes its termination (SP). This use of appetitive is often presented in basic textbooks, but seems not to be used much in the area of behavior analysis, possibly because it still seems to refer primarily to eating. The "angry" man shows an increased probability of striking, insulting, or otherwise inflicting injury and a lowered probability ofaiding, favoring, comforting, or making love. The man 'in love" shows an increased tendency to aid, favor, be with, and caress, and a lowered tendency to injure in any way. "In fear" a man tends to reduce or avoid contact with specific stimuli-as by running away, hiding, covering his eyes and ears; at the same time he is less likely to advance toward such stimuli or into unfamiliar territory. These are useful facts, and something like the layman's mode of classification has a place in a scientific analysis. (p. 162) Skinner doesn't specifically identify the reinforcer-establishing effect of the EO here, but in the previous passage this implication is quite clear. Of course, as he points out in discussing "the total emotion" (p. 166), one must add the respondent UE and UC effects ofemotional operations, and we should also add the possible effects of such operations as unconditioned reinforcement or punish-ment for the behavior that precedes the occurrence of the operation, for a complete picture of the "total emotion" (Skinner, 1953, p. 166 Michael (1982) , I suggested the term establishing stimulus and the symbol SE for a learned motivative relation, with establishing operation (EO) referring to the unlearned relation. It now seems that conditioned establishing operation (CEO) works better because of the easier contrast with unconditioned establishing operation (UEO). This approach also leaves establishing operation (EO) as a useful term for the general motivative relation, without specifying provenance.
1" The term surrogate was suggested by Michael Urbach.
A more complex relation is one in which a stimulus systematically precedes some form of worsening,1' and if the stimulus is terminated prior to the occurrence ofthis worsening, the worsening does not occur. This relation is exemplified by the warning stimulus in an avoidance procedure, and this type of stimulus acquires the capacity to establish its own termination as an effective form of conditioned reinforcement and to evoke any behavior that has accomplished this termination. In the opposite direction, a stimulus that systematically precedes some form of improvement, and whose termination prevents the occurrence of the improvement, will acquire the capacity to establish its own termination as a form of conditioned punishment and to suppress any behavior that has accomplished this termination. In an earlier paper (Michael, 1988) (Michael, 1988) Bicknell, and Sperling (1953) placed rats in a distinctively striped box for 30 min a day for 24 days. During this training one group was placed in the box while food deprived for 22 hr, and the other group was placed in the box while deprived for only 1 hr. After training, both groups were allowed to eat in the striped box following 11.5 hr of food deprivation; the rats with the history of 22-hr deprivation ate significantly more than the group with the history of 1 hr of deprivation. There were several attempts to replicate these results during the next several years; some were successful, but most failed to produce similar results. In a comprehensive review of this line of research, Cravens and Renner (1970) identified several major methodological problems with most of the research, and concluded that the results were essentially uninterpretable.
Mineka (1975) (SP) for any response that precedes it, then so too will any stimulus that is correlated with such onset (SP). Neither ofthese functions (CE, SP) is synonymous, however, with the operant evocative effect of an EO, although their occurrence might always be a good basis for predicting the CEO effect, which might well be based on the same physiological processes. I know of no research bearing directly on the existence of a CEO evocative effect based on pairing with temperature changes, but the possibility seems worth considering.
With sexual motivation, EOs for aggressive behavior, and the other emotional EOs, the issue has not been addressed in terms specific to the CEO, because its distinction from CE, Sr, and SP has not been previously emphasized. There is evidence that a stimulus correlated with painful stimulation will increase the frequency ofaggressive behavior when presented alone (Farns, Gideon, & Ulrich, 1970) , but it is not clear whether it is functioning as CEO, CE, or both. The basic experimental design is simple enough: Correlate a neutral stimulus condition with a UEO, and then see if by itself it increases the reinforcing effectiveness of the consequence relevant to the UEO and increases the momentary frequency of the behavior that has been developed through reinforcement by that consequence. Reinforcing effectiveness is not easy to quantify, but the evocative effect should be easy to measure, and its presence should be evidence enough for the CEO effect. One must, of course, use behavior that is clearly oflearned operant origin to prevent confusion of CEO with CE. Thus, with painful stimulation and aggressive behavior, ifthe potential CEO evokes some arbitrary response (such as lever pressing) that has been developed by reinforcement with access to another organism to attack, then it is functioning as a CEO rather than a CE, because there is no UE for such behavior. The issue would not be clear ifthe behavior studied was striking, biting, and so forth, because these may be elicited by painful stimulation as a UE. Similarly, with sexual motivation, if the previously neutral stimulus evoked an arbitrary response (such as lever pressing) that had been reinforced with access to sexual stimulation, it is functioning as a CEO rather than a CE, but the issue would be unclear if the behavior was pelvic thrusting, which might have been elicited by a UE.
The possibility of developing a surrogate CEO based on painful stimulation as a UEO for escape behavior must be carefully distinguished from the next type ofCEO (to be discussed below). The issue is whether correlating a neutral stimulus with painful stimulation will increase the effectiveness of pain reduction as a form ofreinforcement and evoke the behavior that has been reinforced with pain reduction. It is not clear what it means to increase the effectiveness of pain reduction when no pain is present, but such a stimulus in the presence of mild pain might cause the mild pain reduction (along with the reduction of the CEO) to be more like the reduction ofmore severe pain. Much less difficult to measure would be the extent to which such a stimulus evoked the pain-escape response in the absence of pain. In the typical shock-escape experiment, all that is necessary is to precede the onset ofshock with a warning stimulus and see if the shock-escape response is increased in frequency by the onset of the warning stimulus. Note that this is not the typical escape-avoidance procedure. As described below, there is no question that a stimulus that systematically precedes the delivery ofa second, painful stimulus will evoke the behavior that terminates the first stimulus and thus avoids the onset of the pain. Here the question is whether the warning stimulus will evoke the response that terminates the pain, even though the pain is not yet present, and even though such a response has not prevented the onset of pain.
The situation can be clarified by reference to an unusual type of avoidance experiment, one with escape and avoidance responses of quite different topographies. Imagine a rat in a procedure in which a lever press terminates the shock but a wheel turn terminates the warning stimulus and avoids the shock. The present CEO would be demonstrated if the warning stimulus evoked the lever press; the CEO discussed below would be demonstrated ifthe warning stimulus evoked the wheel turn. The occurrence of such behavior could have other interpretations, but it will probably be possible to exclude these with appropriate experimental designs. This process, like the ones described above, seems intuitively quite plausible, but research directed precisely at the CEO issue has not yet been conducted.
Reflexive CEO: Correlating a stimulus with worsening or improvement. In the traditional discriminated'2 avoidance procedure, an intertrial interval is followed by the onset of an initially neutral warning stimulus, which is in turn followed by the onset of painful stimulation-usually electric shock. Some arbitrary response (i.e., one that is not part of the animal's phylogenic pain-escape repertoire) terminates the painful stimulation and starts the intertrial interval. The same response, if it occurs during the warning stimulus, terminates that 12 The term discriminated arose so that this type ofprocedure could be distinguished from an avoidance procedure with no programmed exteroceptive stimulus except for the shock itself. It also implies that the warning stimulus is a discriminative stimulus for the avoidance response, but the main point ofthe present section contradicts this practice; thus, we should develop a new name for this type of procedure. Sometimes this procedure is called avoidance without a warning stimulus and is then contrasted with avoidance with a warning stimulus. This may be preferable to discriminated, but it implies the effect of the stimulus on the organism-it warns the organism -and it would be preferable if the terms for procedures did not presuppose their behavioral functions. stimulus and starts the intertrial interval, thus avoiding the shock. As a result of exposure to this procedure, many organisms acquire a repertoire that consists of making the relevant response during most of the occurrences of the warning stimulus.
Recall the analysis of the role of shock as an EO for the escape response, the reinforcement for which is shock termination. The warning stimulus has a similar function, except that its capacity to establish its own termination as an effective form of reinforcement is of ontogenic provenance-due to the individual's own history involving the correlation of the presence ofthe warning stimulus with the onset of the painful stimulation. In other words, the warning stimulus as a CEO evokes the so-called avoidance response, just as the painful stimulation as a UEO evokes the escape response. In neither case is the relevant stimulus correlated with the availability of the response consequence, but rather with its reinforcing effectiveness.
In more general terms, any stimulus that is positively correlated with the onset ofpainful stimulation becomes a CEO, in that its own offset will function as reinforcement and it will evoke any behavior that has been followed by this reinforcement. But Fantino & Logan, 1979, pp. 273-275) .
Transitive CEO: Conditional conditioned reinforcement and punishment. When a stimulus condition (S1) is correlated with the correlation between another stimulus (S2) and some form of improvement (or worsening), the presence of the S1 establishes the reinforcing (or punishing) effectiveness of S2 and evokes (or suppresses) the behavior that has been followed by that reinforcement or punishment. Again, this relation has not been directly researched, but it follows easily from existing principles and concepts. Many (probably most) forms of conditioned reinforcement or conditioned punishment are themselves con-ditional upon other stimulus conditions. This notion is sometimes referred to by saying that conditioned reinforcing effectiveness is dependent upon a "context."
Imagine a food-deprived animal in an environment in which it can always produce a 10-s buzzer sound by pressing a lever. Distinctive visual stimuli are related to the relation ofthis auditory stimulus to food. In the presence of a red overhead light, the 10-s buzzer sound ends with the delivery of food. In the absence ofthe red light, the buzzer sound lasts for 10 s and then ends without any food delivery. This is a situation in which the auditory stimulus functions as a conditioned reinforcer, but is conditional upon the color ofthe overhead light. Thus the buzzer onset is not effective as reinforcement until the red overhead light comes on. When it does, with a welltrained animal, the lever press will be evoked. What is the reinforcement for the lever press? Obviously the buzzer onset. How does the red overhead light evoke the lever press? Not as an SD, because it is not correlated with availability of the buzzer-the buzzer is actually available irrespective of the light condition, but it is not an effective form of reinforcement in the absence of the red light. It evokes the lever press as a CEO, a stimulus change that alters the reinforcing effectiveness-the value-of the buzzer sound and evokes the behavior that produces it. Only in the red light has the buzzer been paired or correlated with food, so only in the red light is it an effective form of conditioned reinforcement. The basic relation is still that of correlation, but of a more complex type. The buzzer's correlation with food is itself correlated with the light color.
There have been several attempts to demonstrate this type of CEO with nonhumans (Alling, 1991; McPherson & Osborne, 1986 , 1988 . The experiments have in common the following arrangement. One stimulus condition, S1, can be produced in both the presence and absence of another stimulus condition, S2. Onset of the first stimulus systematically precedes food reinforcement in the presence ofS2, but not in its absence.
In other words, SI onset should function as conditioned reinforcement, but is conditional upon the presence ofS2; it is thus a form of conditional conditioned reinforcement. The stimulus upon which its reinforcing effectiveness is conditional is the supposed CEO. Pigeons learn to stop producing SI except in the presence of S2, but in the experiments cited above it has not been possible to exclude the possibility that S2 is simply functioning as the first discriminative stimulus in a tworesponse chain.
The first element in a chain evoked by an SD is often a CEO of this type. Consider a rat in a chamber in which an auditory stimulus is related as an SD to the availability of food for a lever press. But the lever cannot be pressed until it is located, so the auditory stimulus evokes visual search behavior, which is reinforced by seeing the lever. The auditory stimulus is not related to the availability of this reinforcement, however, but rather to its value. (Once the lever is seen, the other elements of the chain-approaching, touching, pressing-are controlled by a succession ofSDs, but the first element is not.) Similarly, in an avoidance situation, the warning stimulus evokes the avoidance response as a reflexive CEO, but if this requires locating an operandum, the visual search behavior is evoked by the warning stimulus as a transitive CEO, which is correlated with the value ofseeing the lever, not the availability of its sight.
This type of CEO is exemplified by many human examples. A workman is disassembling a piece of equipment. His assistant hands him tools as he requests them. In the process ofdisassembling, he encounters a slotted screw that must be removed, and requests a screwdriver. The sight of the slotted screw "evoked" the request, the reinforcement for which is receiving the screwdriver. To refer to the slotted screw as an SD for the request, however, raises the same difficulty as before. This stimulus has not been differentially correlated with successful requests-screwdrivers are not more available when slotted screws are around than in their absence, but rather more valuable. The slotted screw should be considered a CEO for the request, not an SD. Here the slotted screw is like the red light. In its presence, screwdrivers have been correlated with successful disassembly and are therefore valuable.
Another common human example is a stimulus related to some form of danger, in its evocation of protective behavior. A night watchman patrolling an area hears a suspicious sound and pushes a button on his radio phone that causes the other night watchman to answer the phone and ask if help is needed. The suspicious sound is not an SD in the presence of which such help is more available, but rather more valuable. Note that this effect ofthe danger signal is not to produce its own termination, but rather to increase the value of some other event.
This type of analysis seems to be required irrespective ofthe direction ofthe first or second correlations, and irrespective of whether the final event is improvement or worsening. To consider one more example, let the buzzer be a stimulus that is negatively correlated with a worsening of some sort, in other words, let the buzzer be a safety signal; but let this correlation be in effect only when the overhead light is red. Under other stimulus conditions, the buzzer is uncorrelated with any form of worsening. Now let the lever press be a response, maintained by an unrelated form ofreinforcement, that has in the past also terminated the buzzer, and thus in the red light terminated the "safety," a form of conditioned punishment for the lever press. The lever press, of course, also terminates the buzzer when the red light is not on, but in this case it is not punishment, because in the absence ofthe red light the buzzer is uncorrelated with worsening. We would expect that when the red light came on and the buzzer was on, any tendency to press the lever would be "suppressed." The red light functions as a CEO to cause buzzer offset to function as effective punishment and to suppress any behavior that has been so punished. These higher order relations may not play a major role in the typical experiment with nonhumans because they require such extensive histories. However, they would be expected in the repertoires of longlived species in their natural environments, and most certainly in those ofhumans.
General Implications
Motivation as a topic within behavior analysis can be reintroduced as consideration of those variables-establishing operations-that momentarily alter the effectiveness ofother events as reinforcement (and punishment) and simultaneously alter the frequency ofthose types of behavior that have been followed by that reinforcement (or punishment). A clear distinction is possible between motivative and discriminative variables in terms of whether they are related to the reinforcing effectiveness ofan event or to its availability. The application of this distinction is especially critical for the proper interpretation of some of the effects of painful stimulation. When applied to learned functional relations, this distinction permits classification of a number of seemingly discriminative relations as conditioned establishing operations, further enlarging the topic of motivation within behavior analysis and facilitating useful identification of the various factors involved in the multiple control of human behavior.
